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Abstract 
 
This paper studies how congestion in the public health sector can be used as a redistributive tool. 
In our model, agents differ in income and they can obtain a health service either from a congested 
public hospital or from a non congested private one at a higher price. With pure in-kind 
redistribution, agents fail to internalize their impact on congestion, and the demand for the public 
hospital is higher than optimal. We show that under full information, the optimal redistribution 
and sorting across hospitals can be obtained using a lump-sum tax and a subsidy on the private 
hospital. If income is not observable but the social planner can assign agents across hospitals, the 
optimal congestion is higher than in the first best in order to relax incentive constraints. Finally, if 
agents can freely choose across hospitals, the optimal subsidy on the private hospital price may be 
negative or positive depending on the relative importance of redistribution and efficiency 
concerns. 
 
Keywords: optimal taxation, mixed health care systems, waiting times, income redistribution 
JEL Classification: H21, H23, H44, I11 
 
                                                           
1 Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium; CESifo, Germany.  
E-mail: chiara.canta@uclouvain.be 
2 Département des sciences économiques, ESG UQAM, Montréal, Canada; Université catholique de Louvain, 
CORE, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium. E-mail: leroux.marie-louise@uqam.ca 
We would like to thank K. Cuff, P. De Donder, I. Irvin, R. Lindsey, P-C. Michaud, H. Mou, P. Pestieau, J-F. 
Wen and N.R. Ziebarth for their valuable comments on this paper. 
1 Introduction
Public services often display congestion. In the public debate, this is perceived as a major draw-
back of public services, and there is a consensus that policy measures should be taken to reduce it.
Furthermore, if private non congested facilities offering the same service exist, high-income individuals
may opt for the private sector. While this may help to reduce congestion, it may also increase inequal-
ities, because low-income agents are locked in low-quality public facilities. This paper studies how the
coexistence of a congested public sector and a non congested private sector can be related to income
redistribution. Its main result is that a congested public system can be beneficial for redistribution,
both by relaxing incentive compatibility constraints and by redistributing in kind. At the same time,
because congestion depends on the demand for the public sector, redistribution affects the congestion
of the public sector. This undermines the extent of redistribution with respect to a case in which the
quality of the public sector is under direct control of the social planner. To study this problem, we
will focus on the market of health services, where public intervention is particularly strong and where
the congestion of the public sector is often severe.1
In countries where health services are provided by a tax funded universal health system (such as
the UK, Italy, and Canada), patients can get treated at zero (or very low) price in public hospitals, but
may face congestion, resulting in long waiting times, lower attention from practitioners and crowded
facilities. Alternatively, they can patronize private hospital, where they face lower congestion, but are
charged a price for the treatment. Also the market for health insurance presents similar characteristics.
Public health systems often only covers basic services; private insurance, for a higher premium, offers
a larger choice of providers, limited waiting times and better amenities. For instance, the German
health system relies on compulsory basic insurance with premiums depending on income, but some
individuals are allowed to opt out from the public system and to rely exclusively on private health
insurance that ensures faster and better services.2
The fact that congestion in the public health sector is a very common phenomenon that affects
individual choices and well-being is well documented in the literature.3 In the case of the UK, Besley
et al. (1999) show that waiting times at public hospitals are the only significant variable explaining
1While we concentrate on the case of health services, our model could be applied to any service suffering conges-
tion, such as cultural and educational services (think about museums that charge different prices at different hours),
environmental facilities (think about parks or a beaches), or transport networks (see for instance, Russo, 2013).
2Civil servants and high-income individuals can opt out from the public health insurance and join the private system.
In Germany, as of 2004, 9.1% of the population had joined the private system.
3For a good review of the waiting time phenomenon in the case of elective surgery and policy measures to tackle it,
see for instance Siciliani and Hurst (2005).
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the demand for private health insurance. Similarly, using Spanish data, Jofre-Bonet (2000) shows that
a higher differential between public and private waiting times increases the probability of purchasing
private insurance. She also finds that waiting times in the private sector are not significantly different
from zero. Acknowledging the importance of congestion in the public health sector and the potential
link between income (re)distribution and the use of the public sector, the objective of the present paper
is to design the optimal redistribution policy in the presence of both a congested public sector and a
non congested private sector.
We study a model in which agents only differ in income and can be treated either in a public
congested hospital or in a non congested private hospital that charges a higher price. The public
hospital is financed through taxation and it has a fixed capacity; this latter assumption is reasonable,
at least in the short run. Such capacity constraint leads to congestion, which decreases with the
capacity of the public hospital and increases with the number of agents that use it. Depending on
their income, agents have a different willingness to pay to avoid congestion so that, under pure in-
kind redistribution (i.e. the public hospital is financed by a head tax), low-income agents use the
public hospital while high-income agents use the private one. Thus, congestion is endogenous and it
depends on income redistribution. We characterize the optimal income taxation policy and the optimal
repartition of agents across hospitals, under, successively, complete and incomplete information. We
also distinguish between the case where the social planner can directly assign patients to hospitals
from the case where agents are free to choose.
The first best allocation is such that consumptions are equalized across agents, and each agent
has the same probability of being treated in the public hospital. Moreover, fewer agents are treated
in the public hospital in the first best than in the pure in-kind redistribution case. This is due to
a simple externality problem: when choosing a hospital, agents do not internalize the effect of their
choice on the congestion borne by all the other agents using the public hospital. If the social planner
cannot directly assign agents to hospitals, the first best allocation can still be decentralized through
individualized transfers and a subsidy (or a tax) on the price of the private hospital.
If the social planner cannot observe agents’ income but can assign them across hospitals, congestion
is distorted up, and the probability of being treated in the public hospital decreases in income. Such
a mechanism enables income redistribution as it discourages mimicking from high-income agents, who
prefer to pay a high tax than to bear congestion. Therefore, our results provide a redistributive
rationale to systems like the German one, where only low-income individuals are locked in the public
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system.
Finally, if the social planner cannot assign agents across hospital, the tax schedule can only be
conditional on the individual hospital choice, and it consists of a uniform lump-sum tax and of a linear
subsidy on the price of the private hospital treatment. The optimal subsidy can be either positive
or negative depending on the relative importance of redistributive and efficiency (i.e. congestion)
concerns. If redistribution concerns dominates, it is optimal to have a tax on the private hospital
treatment in order to extract resources from high-income agents. If on the contrary, congestion concerns
dominate, the optimal subsidy may be positive. In words, income redistribution through a tax on the
use of the private hospital is limited by its effect on congestion in the public hospital.
To sum up our results, we find that congestion in the public sector is a double-edged tool in redis-
tribution policy. On the one hand, it enables income redistribution: it relaxes incentive compatibility
constraints if the social planner can assign agents, and allows redistribution in kind if agents are free
to choose between the public and the private sector. On the other hand, with respect to the case in
which the quality of the public sector does not depend itself on taxation, taxation entails a higher loss
in efficiency because it enhances congestion.
Our paper overlaps different strands of the Public and Health Economics literature. First, it is
close to the literature which studies optimal taxation models in the presence of externalities. This
literature, which was initiated with Sandmo (1975), concentrates on mixed commodity-and-income
taxation policies when one commodity generates an externality.4 Our paper differs from this literature
in that, first, the decision to consume the externality-generating good is extensive: the agent either
goes to the public system or not. Second, this decision, which is at the origin of the externality,
only depends on individuals’ income levels so that the size of the externality is directly linked to
the population’s income (re)distribution. Finally, one of our paper’s objectives is to show how the
congestion externality can foster redistribution through the relaxation of self-selection constraints.5
Second, our paper is close to the literature on the public provision of private goods as a mean to
redistribute in-kind. Besley and Coate (1991) first showed that universal provision of private goods,
financed by a head tax, enhances redistribution. Intuitively, the rich pay for the public provision but
buy a service of better quality from private firms and let the poor use the public facility. Our paper
4See, for instance, Pirttila and Tuomala (1997), Cremer et al. (1998), Kopczuk (2003) and Sheshinski (2004).
5Using a different framework, Pirttila and Tuomala (1997) show that, if there is complementarity between leisure
and environmental quality, the exacerbation of the externality can help relaxing self-selection constraints, in a two-
income-type model. Also, Cremer et al. (1998) show that the externality affects income taxation when commodity
taxation is linear; but this is due to the fact that agents with different incomes consume different quantities of the
externality-generating good.
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builds on the same idea except that, in our model, the quality of the public good is endogenous and
suffers congestion, which can be only indirectly controlled by the planner. Clark and Kim (2007)
also study an in-kind redistributive mechanism that enables the self-selection of types. Assuming
only two types of agents (high and low ability), they show that a pricing-mechanism consisting in
offering the target good at high money price and low time price or at a low money price but high time
price achieves commodity-specific egalitarianism when types are not observable. The main differences
with our paper reside in the redistributive objective and in the restriction to two types. Finally,
Blackorby and Donaldson (1988), Blomquist and Christiansen (1995), Boadway and Marchand (1995)
and Cremer and Gahvari (1997) also analyze the usefulness of the public provision of private goods
as a redistribution instrument (together with different tax policies) under asymmetric information on
agents’ health status or productivity.6 Like our paper, these papers show how public provision of a
private good can help relaxing self-selection constraints under asymmetric information. However, they
assume that agents can consume different quantities of the public good for a fixed quality, while in
our paper the quantity is fixed but the quality, i.e. the size of congestion, is endogenous and directly
linked to the income redistribution policy.
Finally, our paper is also related to the literature that rationalizes the existence of waiting times.
In that respect, our paper is close to Bucovetsky (1984) which shows that, in a model where labor is
endogenous, the allocation of commodities by waiting is optimal. The idea is that when the planner
cannot observe productivities, self-selection constraints create distortions. Yet, the willingness to wait
is a signal of productivity that can be used to elicit information on agents’ type. However, that model
is different from ours as it considers only two productivity classes, a fixed waiting time and commodity
taxation together with lump-sum taxes. In line with Bucovetsky (1984), Hoel and Sæther (2003) show,
using a non linear taxation model, that it is optimal to provide the public good at a lower quality
level so as to solve self-selection problems. They assume that the waiting time is directly set by the
social planner and that agents have the same income but different costs associated to waiting.7 This is
clearly different from our paper. Finally, Marchand and Schroyen (2005), in a linear income taxation
model, use waiting times as a rationing device equating demand and supply in the public sector, whose
size is controlled by the social planner. Our approach is different as we do not study the optimal size
of the public sector but rather consider the public capacity as given and waiting times as the result of
agents’ choices.
6These papers only consider two types of agents while we allow for a continuum of types.
7To be fair, they mention that income and waiting costs are likely to be positively correlated.
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All in all, the originality of our paper consists in considering that the quality of the public health
system depends on the number of patients it treats. We also show that the taxation scheme affects the
congestion in the public system. In turn, congestion affects the feasible taxation scheme. With non
linear taxation, an upward distortion of congestion discourages mimicking of high-income agents and
increases welfare. This is in line with the literature: distorting the quality of the public health system
relaxes incentive compatibility constraints. However, in our model the distortion in quality is possible
only through the distortion in the number of agents being treated in the public sector, which in turn
depends on the taxation in place. Thus, the extent of redistribution is both a consequence and a cause
of congestion.
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we provide the basic set up and derive
the pure in-kind redistribution case. In Section 3, we characterize the first-best allocation and show
how it can be decentralized. In the fourth section, we solve the problem under asymmetric information
on agents’ income. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Basic assumptions
We consider a one-period model in which there is a mass 1 of agents who differ only with respect
to income, y. Income is a continuous variable with support [y, y¯]. In the following, we denote f(y) and
F (y) as, respectively, the density and the cumulative functions of y. Agents obtain utility from the
consumption of a normal good, c, and from the consumption of a health service which is available in two
facilities, say hospitals. These hospitals differ in quality. The first one, is public and is characterized
by congestion. The other is private and is not affected by congestion.8 The quality of the health
treatment is equal to (h−W ), where h is a constant representing the benefit of being in good health.
The variable W is the size of congestion. We assume that agents have identical preferences that are
quasi linear in the net benefit from the treatment:
u(c) + (h−W ),
where u′(.) > 0 and u′′(.) < 0. We assume that h is high enough, to ensure that everybody chooses
to be treated. For agents being treated in the public hospital, W ≥ 0 while for agents being treated
8Without loss of generality, we could assume that congestion in the private hospital is positive, as long as it is lower
than in the public hospital.
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in the private hospital, W = 0. Thus, the public congested hospital yields a lower individual benefit
than the private hospital. For instance, agents might experience delays or lower availability of health
care professionals. Note also that, for simplicity, we assume that h is the same for every agent and is
independent of income and of the hospital choice.9
In the following, w designates the size of congestion in the public hospital and takes the form
w =

ρ−xˆ
xˆ if ρ ≥ xˆ
0 if ρ < xˆ
(1)
where ρ ∈ [0, 1] is the number of agents being treated in the public hospital. The capacity of the
congested public hospital, xˆ ≤ 1, is assumed to be fixed. This assumption is reasonable since adjusting
the capacity might be difficult, at least in the short run.
The cost of a treatment in the public hospital is equal to k, while it is equal to p in the private
hospital. In the following we will essentially concentrate on the case where k ≤ p. A first possible
justification for this assumption is that the private hospital has some idle capacity in order to ensure
no congestion.10 However, we will also comment on the case where k > p.
In the remainder of the paper, we assume that health services are needed with probability one.
Alternatively, we could have considered a framework where the service is needed with a probability
pi ∈ (0, 1) and agents purchase insurance. Under the assumption of fair insurance contracts, the
individual ex-ante utility would be u(c)+pi(h−W ) and our qualitative results would remain unchanged.
Thus, our model can easily be extended to health insurance markets where different contracts cover
services of different quality in case of illness. For instance, public health insurance usually provides
full coverage for basic treatments. Agents can opt for private insurance contracts to get higher quality
or waiting-free services at a higher price.11
Finally, in the following, we will call “public” the congested hospital but its ownership type is not
crucial. What matters in our model is that it is financed by the government.
2.2 Pure in-kind redistribution
As a benchmark, we consider a situation where the government only intervenes through the public
9If h was agent-specific, we would have to deal with two dimensions of individual heterogeneity; under asymmetric
information, this would significantly complicate the model. Such a framework is beyond the scope of the paper.
10For a full discussion see Hoel and Sæther (2003), p. 604.
11Public insurance may be cheaper then private insurance also because of lower administrative costs, economies of scale
or of smaller marketing costs. For instance, a 2011 study of the Kaiser Family Foundation estimates the administrative
costs of Medicare to be approximately 2%, which are substantially lower than the ones of private insurers.
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provision of health care. In this case, the public hospital is financed through a head tax, denoted
by T . To satisfy the government resource constraint, the head tax must be equal to ρ˜k, where ρ˜ is
the equilibrium demand for the public hospital. If agents prefer the private hospital, they pay the
treatment out of pocket. In a perfectly competitive market, the price of the treatment in the private
hospital equals the marginal cost, p.
Note that this case is equivalent to the one studied in Besley and Coate (1991) in that the publicly
provided good is financed through a head tax. However, the main difference with our model is that
they assume that the quality of the public sector is set directly by the government. Here, the quality
of the public good is represented by congestion.
The agent’s problem consists in choosing which hospital to patronize, taking T as given. Since
the decision is discrete, we compare the agent’s indirect utility in each case. If he chooses the public
hospital, the agent’s indirect utility is
u(y − T ) + (h− w),
where w is defined by (1). On the contrary, if the agent chooses the private hospital, he has to pay p
but he avoids congestion, so that his indirect utility is
u(y − T − p) + h.
Using the above indirect utility functions, an agent with income y chooses the public hospital if and
only if
ϕ(y) = u(y − T )− u(y − T − p)− w ≥ 0.
Under the assumption that k ≤ p, ϕ(y) is monotonically decreasing in y. This implies that the marginal
willingness to pay for the private hospital treatment increases in y. Hence, all agents having an income
below the threshold y˜, such that ϕ(y˜) = 0 choose the public hospital, and the demand for the public
hospital is ρ˜ = F (y˜). It is straightforward to see that in equilibrium, the size of congestion w˜ is always
positive. Thus, w˜ = F (y˜)/xˆ − 1. In equilibrium, the income threshold y˜ is implicitly defined by the
following equation:
u(y˜ − F (y˜)k)− u(y˜ − F (y˜)k − p) = F (y˜)
xˆ
− 1. (2)
This is not surprising as it is less expensive than the private. Under the assumption that 1−f(y˜)k > 0,
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y˜ is increasing in xˆ, in the price of treatment in the private hospital, p. Furthermore, it increases in the
cost of the public hospital, k because a higher k implies a higher head tax and thus, lower willingness
to pay for the private hospital.
3 First best allocation
In this section, we first derive the optimal allocation when the social planner has perfect information
on agents’ income, and can assign agents to the public and the private hospital. We then show how
this solution can be decentralized when agents can freely choose between hospitals.
3.1 Optimal allocation when incomes are observable
We assume that the social planner seeks to maximize the sum of a concave transformation Φ of
agents utility function. In our setting, the first best policy consists in the allocation of consumptions
between agents and in the repartition of the population between hospitals. The problem of the social
planner consists then in setting individualized lump-sum taxes Ty for each agent with income y.12
Furthermore, the social planner sets the probability θy that an agent with income y is assigned to the
public hospital.13
The first best program is the following:
max
θy,Ty
ˆ y¯
y
¯
Φ (u(y − Ty)− θyw + h) f(y)dy
s.to
ˆ y¯
y
¯
[Ty − θyk − (1− θy)p] f(y)dy ≥ 0
where w =

´ y¯
y θyf(y)dy
xˆ − 1 if
´ y¯
y θyf(y)dy ≥ xˆ
0 otherwise
(3)
The first constraint is the standard resource constraint of the economy. Note that, in our framework,
the social planner is inequality averse with respect to ex-ante utilities.
12We also solved the problem allowing the social planner to set transfers conditional on being treated in the public
and private hospital, TPUy and TPRy , and found that, at the optimum, TPUy = TPRy .
13In order to be as general as possible, we do not restrict θy to be binary (i.e. θy ∈ {0, 1}). We will indeed show that
in the first best the optimal θy is the same for every agent, and that it is interior as long as wFB is neither too high nor
too low.
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The first-order conditions with respect to Ty and θy are14
∂£
∂Ty
= −Φ′ (EUy)u′ (cy) + λ = 0 ∀y (4)
∂£
∂θy
= −wΦ′ (EUy) f (y)
− ∂w
∂θy
ˆ y¯
y
¯
θyΦ
′ (EUy) f(y)dy + λ [p− k] f(y) = 0. (5)
where cy = y − Ty denotes consumption and EUy is the ex-ante utility of an agent with income y:
EUy = u(cy)− θyw + h.
For further use, we find the first best marginal rate of substitution between θy and Ty to be equal to
MRS(θy, Ty) ≡ − w
u′(y − Ty) = −(p− k) +
1
xˆ
ˆ y¯
y
¯
θy
u′(cy)
f(y)dy. (6)
Let us now study in more details the first order conditions and find the characteristics of the first best
allocation. Equation (5) displays the marginal costs and benefits of θy. Marginal costs include the
direct effect on the utility of agents y and the impact on congestion for all other agents assigned to
the public hospital. The marginal benefit is the efficiency gain due to the fact that more agents use
the less expensive facility. Note that it is always optimal to set
´ y¯
y θyf(y)dy ≥ xˆ, as
∂£
∂θy
∣∣∣∣´ y¯
y θyf(y)dy<xˆ
= λ [p− k] f(y) > 0,
when p−k ≥ 0. Since the public hospital is more efficient than its private counterpart, it is optimal to
have congestion in the public hospital. This, in turn, implies that (5) holds with equality. Rearranging
this expression, we obtain:
wΦ′ (EUy) = λ [p− k]− 1
xˆ
ˆ y¯
y
¯
θyΦ
′ (EUy) f(y)dy. (7)
Since the right-hand side of this equality is independent from y, EUy = EU ∀y. Replacing in (4), we
conclude that cy = c¯, and thus, that higher-income agents pay higher taxes: if y′ > y, then Ty′ > Ty.
In turn, the equalization of consumptions across agents implies that θFBy = θFB for all y, and condition
14We assume that the second order conditions are satisfied.
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´ y¯
y θyf(y)dy ≥ xˆ reduces to θFB ≥ xˆ. Replacing Φ′ (EU)u′ (c¯) = λ into (7) we get
w
λ
u′ (c¯)
=λ [p− k]− 1
xˆ
ˆ y¯
y
¯
θ
λ
u′ (c¯)
f(y)dy
⇐⇒ θFB = xˆu
′ (c¯) [p− k] + 1
2
. (8)
The optimal probability θFB is such that the marginal increase in congestion in the public hospital
exactly equals the gains in efficiency. Note however that corner solutions are possible. For instance,
if the public hospital has a large capacity, and/ or it is much more efficient than the private hospital,
i.e., xˆ (u′ (c¯) [p− k] + 1) ≥ 2, then θFB = 1 and it is optimal to have all agents being treated in the
public hospital. Conversely, if xˆ and (p− k) are relatively small, i.e., u′ (c¯) [p− k] < 1, then θFB = xˆ.
Otherwise, the optimal θ is given by (8). To sum up, the optimal probability of being assigned to the
public hospital is
θFB = min
{
1, max
{
xˆ, xˆ
u′ (c¯) [p− k] + 1
2
}}
. (9)
If the solution is interior,
wFB =
u′ (c¯) [p− k]− 1
2
.
In the first best, the optimal number of patients treated in the public hospital only depends on the
relative efficiency of the public and the private hospital, as well as on the size of xˆ. Note that the use
of the public hospital is exclusively justified by its higher efficiency. Whenever the private hospital is
less costly than its public counterpart (p < k), no agents should be assigned to the public hospital.
Let us stress that, as long as Φ(.) is strictly concave, the social planner is averse to inequality in
ex-ante utilities. Thus, an allocation where some agents have different θs (for instance, some have
θy = 1, while others have θy = 0) is not optimal in our framework. However, the social planner is
not averse to inequalities in ex-post utilities, which implies that agents treated in the public hospital
are not compensated for congestion. Ex post, they have a lower utility than patients treated in the
private hospital: u(c¯)+(h−wFB) ≤ u(c¯)+h. If, on the opposite, Φ(.) is linear, inequalities in ex-ante
utilities do not matter, so that the optimal probabilities are undetermined and any set of probabilities
such that
´ y¯
y θyf(y)dy/xˆ− 1 = wFB is optimal.
We summarize our results in the following proposition:
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Proposition 1 Assume that the social planner observes the agents’ income, y, and that he can assign
agents to either the public or the private hospital. The first-best optimum can be decentralized as
follows:
i) Taxes are increasing in income, but do not depend on the hospital in which agents are treated.
ii) The probability θFBy to be assigned to the congested public hospital is the same across income
levels and is given by (9).
Let us finally compare the number of agents treated in the public hospital in the first best and
when only redistribution in-kind is possible. It is likely to be different for two reasons. First, the
distribution of income is different. Second, under pure in-kind redistribution, agents take ρ as given,
not anticipating that by choosing the public hospital they increase the congestion borne by all other
agents in that hospital. To make this second point explicit, consider the optimal allocation of patients
across hospitals under pure in-kind redistribution. The problem is
max
θy
ˆ y¯
y
Φ (θyu(y − T ) + (1− θy)u(y − T − p)− θyw + h) f(y)dy.
s.to T = k
ˆ y¯
y
¯
θyf(y)dy
The first derivative with respect to θy is
Φ′ (EUy) [u(y − T )− u(y − T − p)− w]
− k
ˆ y¯
y
Φ′ (EUy) (θyu′(y − T ) + (1− θy)u(y − T − p)) f(y)dy
− 1
f(y)
∂w
∂θy
ˆ y¯
y
θyΦ
′ (EUy) f(y)dy. (10)
As it was established in Section 2.2, the first term is decreasing in y, is positive when y < y˜ (as
defined in (2)) and negative when y > y˜. Moreover, as before, one can show that w ≥ 0, so that
∂w/∂θy = f(y)/xˆ and the last two terms are constant and negative. Thus, there exists a threshold
y∗ ≤ y˜ such that (10) is equal to zero. For all agents with income below y∗, (10) is positive so that
they should be treated in the public hospital (θy = 1). On the opposite, for all agents with income
higher than y∗, (10) is negative and they should be treated in the private hospital (θy = 0). This is
due to the fact that the marginal willingness to pay to avoid congestion is increasing in income.
Hence, under pure in kind-redistribution, congestion ends up being higher than optimal, because
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y˜ > y∗. Indeed, agents do not internalize the impact of their choice on government resources (second
term in (10)) and their impact on congestion (third term in (10)). This is different from Besley and
Coate (1991), who assume that the quality of the public sector is set exogenously by the social planner.
Let us now discuss how the social planner can decentralize the first best optimum if he cannot
assign agents across hospitals.
3.2 Decentralized solution when the social planner cannot assign agents
In the previous section, the social planner could assign agents to different hospitals. However,
assuming that the social planner has no direct control on agents’ choice of hospitals seems more
natural. In this case, more instruments than lump-sum taxes are needed to implement the first best
solution. We show in this section that it is possible to decentralize it with a uniform subsidy on the
price of the non congested private hospital, in addition to individualized lump-sum taxes.15 Without
loss of generality, we assume that the public hospital is financed exclusively through taxation, so that
the price agents face to be treated in this hospital is equal to zero.
Since in the first best allocation each agent obtains the same disposable income and the same
probability θFB of being treated in the congested public hospital, the social planner has to resort to
random taxation. He then proposes a contract (Ty, T ′y, θ) to agents with income y such that agents
pay either Ty with probability θ or T ′y with probability (1− θ). He also sets the level of the subsidy τ
on the price of the private hospital.16 Given the level of lump-sum taxes they face (Ty or T ′y), agents
then choose which hospital to visit and, if they choose the private hospital, they receive the subsidy.
In Appendix A we prove the following proposition:
Proposition 2 The first best optimum can be decentralized through the following individualized tax
and transfer scheme and a subsidy on the price of the non congested private hospital:
1. Agents with income y pay either Ty = y − c¯ with probability θFB, defined by (9), or T ′y =
y − (c¯+ (1− τ)p) with probability 1− θFB.
2. Agents choosing to be treated in the private hospital receive a subsidy, τ ∈ [τ , τ¯ ], where τ and τ¯
15Note that the social planner could equivalently regulate the price p. However, we assume here that the social planner
has no direct control on p.
16Implicit in our model is the full subsidization of the public sector. Yet, it is easy to show that reducing the subsidy
on the congested public hospital is equivalent to increasing the subsidy on the price of the private hospital since the
total demand for health treatments is inelastic (see Hoel and Sæther, 2003).
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are both smaller than one and are implicitly defined by
u(c¯)− u (c¯− (1− τ¯)p) =
[
θFB
xˆ
− 1
]
,
and
u (c¯+ (1− τ)p)− u(c¯) =
[
θFB
xˆ
− 1
]
.
This ensures the optimal sorting of agents: a proportion θFB of agents is treated in the congested public
hospital.
Two aspects of this result should be highlighted. First, the optimal subsidy might be negative.
Consequently, either a tax or a subsidy work in decentralizing the first best. These two options are
indifferent for the final allocation, since taxes and transfers are adjusted so as to ensure that every agent
has the same net consumption c¯ irrespective of the hospital they visit. Receiving a high disposable
income and paying a tax is equivalent to receiving a smaller disposable income together with a subsidy.
Second, we assume here that the taxes only depend on income. Once they have paid their taxes,
agents are free to choose their most preferred hospital, given the relative prices set by the social
planner. To say it differently, the subsidy τ is such that one obtains the optimal repartition of agents
between hospitals. If the lump-sum taxes were also dependent on the hospital choice, it is clear that
the subsidy would be a redundant instrument.
4 Asymmetric information
We now assume that the social planner cannot observe agents’ income, y (and thus, their consump-
tion) and, like in the previous section, we consider successively cases where the social planner can or
cannot assign agents to different hospitals.
In the first case, the social planner can assign agents to hospitals, and he offers them a menu of
contracts (θy, Ty), specifying the probability to be assigned to the public hospital and the income tax
to pay, taking into account possible mimicking behaviors.
In the second case, the social planner cannot assign agents across hospitals. The social planner can
nonetheless observe the hospital choice made by each agent, so that transfers depend on this choice.
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4.1 Unobservable incomes and possibility to assign agents across hospitals
Let us first study the case where the social planner cannot observe incomes, but can nonetheless
assign agents. The problem of the social planner consists in designing a contract (θy, Ty) which depends
on the agent’s reported income:
max
θy,Ty
ˆ y¯
y
¯
Φ (u(y − Ty)− θyw + h) f(y)dy
s.to
ˆ y¯
y
¯
[Ty − θyk − (1− θy)p] f(y)dy ≥ 0
s.to u(y − Ty)− θyw ≥ u(y − Ty˜)− θy˜w ∀y, y˜
where w is defined by (3). The first constraint is the resource constraint while the last constraints are
the incentive constraints. Combining them yields
u(y − Ty)− u(y′ − Ty) ≥ u(y − Ty′)− u(y′ − Ty′),
implying that Ty has to be non decreasing in y.17 Moreover, the Spence-Mirlees condition holds, since
MRSy(θy, Ty) = −w/u′(y−Ty) is monotonically decreasing in y. This means that high-income people
need to be compensated more than low-income agents for an increase in θy. The set of incentive
constraints can thus be replaced by a unique local incentive constraint of the form
EU˙y = u
′(y − Ty),
together with the monotonicity constraint, T˙y > 0. This, in turn, implies that θ˙y < 0, to ensure that
incentive constraints are satisfied.18 Such a contract design (progressive taxation together with a de-
creasing probability of being treated in the congested public hospital) ensures redistribution from high-
toward low-income agents, while preventing mimicking behavior. Using the local incentive constraint,
17See Laffont and Tirole, 1993.
18From now on, we assume that the first order approach is valid, i.e. that T˙y > 0 and θ˙y < 0. More precisely, we
assume that this is the case in the unconstrained problem in which θy ∈ <. We will characterize a necessary condition
for this to hold. Yet, we may have bunching due the fact that θy must belong to the interval [0, 1]. We come back on
these points later.
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the problem consists in maximizing the following Lagrangian:
£ =
ˆ y¯
y
¯
{Φ (EUy) f(y)
+λ [Ty − θyk − (1− θy)p] f(y)
+µy [u
′(y − Ty)] + µ˙yEUy
+αy [u(y − Ty)− θyw + h− EUy]} dy,
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the resource constraint, µy is the co-state variable
and αy is the shadow value of the constraint EUy = u(y − Ty)− θyw + h.
The first order conditions are
∂£
∂EUy
= Φ′ (EUy) f (y)− αy + µ˙y = 0 (11)
∂£
∂Ty
= λf (y)− µyu′′(y − Ty)− αyu′(y − Ty) = 0 (12)
∂£
∂θy
= λ (p− k) f (y)− αyw − ∂w
∂θy
ˆ y¯
y
αyθydy = 0. (13)
We show in the appendix that µy has the following expression:
µy =
´ y¯
y
(Φ′ (EUx)u′(y − Tx)− λ) f(x)dx
u′(y − Ty) < 0,
with transversality conditions µy¯ = µy = 0. The term µy measures the social net marginal loss
associated with a marginal decrease of the utility of every agents with income higher than y.19 We
show in the appendix that µy is negative, which means that reducing EUy for all agents with income
greater than y leads to an increase in welfare. In other words, redistributing from high-income agents
to low-income ones maximizes social welfare. Therefore, as high-income agents are willing to pay more
to avoid congestion, it is optimal to set a tax schedule (Ty, θy) such that T˙y ≥ 0 and θ˙y ≤ 0. The
probability of facing congestion is used to relax incentive compatibility constraints.
Remark that, since ∂EUy/∂Ty = −u′(y − Ty), µyu′(y − Ty) could be interpreted as the social net
marginal loss associated with an increase in Ty for all agents with income greater than y. The gain
from an increase in Ty is represented by λ, and it corresponds to the gain in resources. At the same
time, an increase in Ty leads to a decrease in the utility of agents with income above y measured by
19See Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), p.417.
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Φ′(EUy)u′(y − Ty).
Let us now study in more details the first order condition with respect to θy. It can be rewritten
as
A− αy
f(y)
= 0,
where A ≡
[
λ (p− k)− 1xˆ
´ y¯
y αyθydy
]
/w is constant across y. First, we show in the appendix that a
necessary condition for θ˙y < 0 within the interval [0, 1] is that αy/f(y) increases in y. In our analysis,
we impose that this is always the case. However, because of the constraint on the support of θy,
there may be bunching at the top and/or at the bottom of the interval [y, y¯], even though αy/f(y) is
increasing in y. For instance, if p − k is positive and large, the private hospital is much more costly
than the public one and it may be optimal to assign some agents to the public hospital with probability
one. These are the agents at the bottom of the income distribution. If p− k is large enough, we may
even have bunching on the whole interval and in such case, no redistribution is possible. In the same
way, if p−k is very small, it may be the case that, in the second best, θy < 1 for some agents while for
others (the high-income ones), θy = 0. Note that these results are very different from the first best,
in which the use of a congested public hospital was justified only if p > k. In the second best, even
if p < k, θy may be positive for some agents (or even for each of them). This is due to the fact that,
under asymmetric information, a congested hospital serves redistribution, through the relaxation of
self selection constraints.
Assuming an interior solution for θy and replacing (12) into (13) we obtain the second best marginal
rate of substitution between θy and Ty:
MRS(θy, Ty) = −(p− k) + 1
xˆ
ˆ y¯
y
θy
u′(cy)
f(y)dy − 1
λ
[
wu′′(cy)
f(y)u′(cy)
µy +
1
xˆ
ˆ y¯
y
µyu
′′(cy)
u′(cy)
θydy
]
.
As µy < 0, both terms in brackets are positive and MRS(θy, Ty) is distorted downward (upward in
absolute terms) in comparison to its first best value, defined in (6). In other words, in the second
best, an increase in Ty has to be compensated by a higher decrease in θy than in the first best to
ensure incentive compatibility. The distortion consists of two terms. The first one is rather standard:
increasing θy has a distributional effect captured by µy (described above), and a distortionary effect
captured by u′′(cy)/u′(cy). The second term is less standard and accounts for the effect of an increase
in θy on the congestion cost borne by all agents in the economy. Consequently, congestion constitutes
an additional limit to the size of redistribution, by increasing the distortion created by taxation. This
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would not be the case if the quality was directly set by the social planner.
Let us finally study the size of congestion in the second best. Like in the first best, when p−k > 0,
it is always optimal to have congestion since the first order condition with respect to θy, (13), evaluated
in w = 0 is positive. Thus, replacing (12) into (13), one obtains
wSB =
u′ (cy)
(λf (y)− µyu′′ (cy))
[
λ (p− k) f(y)− f (y)
xˆ
ˆ y¯
y
λf (y)− µyu′′ (cy)
u′ (cy)
θyf(y)dy
]
,
Comparing wSB with its first best counterpart defined in (7), it is possible to show that the two
expressions only differ by the term µyu′′ (cy) /u′(cy). Since µy < 0, we find that, everything else being
equal, congestion is higher in the second best than in the first best. Increasing congestion enables
income redistribution by imposing a higher tax burden on high-income agents while avoiding mimicking
under asymmetric information. If high-income agents mimic low-income ones, they will suffer higher
congestion and that, with a higher probability (as θ˙y < 0). Hence, setting higher expected congestion
for low-income agents than for high-income ones is optimal.
Our results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Assume that the social planner does not observe agents’ income, y, but that he can
assign them across hospitals. When p > k, the second-best optimum involves that:
i) θy decreases with y and Ty increases with y.
ii) The marginal rate of substitution between θy and Ty is distorted downward at the second best.
iii) As compared to the first best, congestion in the public hospital is higher.
These results also apply to the insurance market whenever the government can induce agents to buy
different insurance contracts. For instance, in Germany, low-income agents are obliged to get public
insurance (in the notation of the model, this would mean that their θ equals 1) and high-income agents
can opt out (if private insurance is attractive enough, all such agents do opt out, and θ = 0). Our
results imply that this system can be justified on redistributive grounds: such an arrangement helps
to relax the incentive compatibility constraints and allows for a higher fiscal pressure on high-income
agents.
4.2 Unobservable incomes and free individual choice of hospitals
Let us finally assume that the social planner cannot use the probability θy as a policy instrument.
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This is a reasonable scenario, since in practice it is unlikely that the social planner has enough power
to assign agents across hospitals according to an income-dependent lottery. First, such a system would
require a high implementation cost. Second, it is incompatible with a certain view of fairness, and in
particular with the principle of equal treatment of equals: ex-ante identical agents may obtain different
ex-post utility because of randomization.20 Hence, in this section, we assume that the social planner
imposes a lump-sum tax, T to all agents, but that agents who decide to be treated in the private
hospital receive a subsidy, τ , on the price p.21
Given the social planner’s instruments, agents freely choose where to be treated. An agent with
income y chooses the public hospital if and only if
u (y − T )− w − u (y − T − (1− τ)p)) ≥ 0.
The left-hand side of this expression being decreasing in y, there exists an income threshold, y˜(T, τ)
such that every agent with income above (resp. below) this threshold strictly prefers the private (resp.
public) hospital, when the social planner proposes the fiscal scheme (T, τ). This income threshold
solves:
u (y˜(T, τ)− T )− w(y˜(T, τ)) = u (y˜(T, τ)− T − (1− τ)p) , (14)
where
w(y˜(T, τ)) =
F (y˜(T, τ)
xˆ
− 1.
Note that in our framework, the subsidy on p can be either positive or negative. If τ < 0, agents face a
tax and high-income agents (who choose the private hospital) face higher overall taxation. This would
redistribute income from high- to low-income agents, even though incomes are unobservable. However,
a tax on p results in bigger congestion. Thus, the social planner, when setting τ , will have to trade-off
redistribution concerns and congestion containment.
The social planner’s problem is now:
max
T,τ
ˆ y˜(T,τ)
y
Φ (u(y − T ) + h− w(y˜(T, τ))) f(y)dy +
ˆ y¯
y˜(T,τ)
Φ (u(y − T − (1− τ)p) + h) f(y)dy
s.to T ≥ F (y˜(T, τ))k + [1− F (y˜(T, τ))] τp.
20For a discussion, see Brito et al. (1995) and Fleurbaey (2008).
21Also Hoel and Sæther (2003) study the optimal subsidy on private, non congested treatments. However, in their
model, there is no concern for income redistribution as agents all have the same income.
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The first-order conditions with respect to τ and T are, respectively
∂£
∂τ
=− ∂y˜
∂τ
[
∂w
∂y˜
ˆ y˜
y
Φ′ (u(y − T ) + h− w(y˜)) f(y)dy + λ(k − τp)f(y˜)
]
+ p
ˆ y¯
y˜
Φ′ (u(y − T − (1− τ)p) + h)u′(y − T − (1− τ)p)f(y)dy − λ [1− F (y˜)] p = 0 (15)
∂£
∂T
=−
 ´ y˜y Φ′ (u(y − T ) + h− w(y˜))u′(y − T )f(y)dy
+
´ y¯
y˜
Φ′ (u(y − T − (1− τ)p) + h)u′(y − T − (1− τ)p)f(y)dy

− ∂y˜
∂T
[
∂w
∂y˜
ˆ y˜
y
Φ′ (u(y − T ) + h− w(y˜)) f(y)dy + λ(k − τp)f(y˜)
]
+ λ = 0, (16)
where, for ease of notation, we set y˜ ≡ y˜(T, τ).
Our results are derived in the appendix and summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Assume that the social planner does not observe income, y, and that agents are free
to choose between the public and the private hospital. The optimal tax scheme consists of a lump-sum
tax T and a linear subsidy τ on the price of the private hospital, equal to:
τ∗ =
−cov (Φ′u′,k) + ∂y˜c∂τ 1p
[
1
xˆ
´ y˜
y Φ
′ (u(y − T ) + h− w(y˜)) f(y)dy + λk
]
f(y˜)
λf(y˜)∂y˜c/∂τ
, (17)
where k = {0, 1} takes value 0 (resp. 1) if the agent gets treated in the public (resp. private) hospital.
The term cov (Φ′u′,k) is the covariance between the social marginal utility of consumption and the
purchase of a treatment in the private hospital.
Defining the compensated derivative of y˜ with respect to τ as
∂y˜c
∂τ
=
∂y˜
∂τ
+
∂y˜
∂T
∂T
∂τ
, (18)
it can be proven that it is negative, by fully differentiating (14) together with the resource constraint
of the government. The denominator in (17), which represents the efficiency term, is thus negative.
Increasing the subsidy on p distorts individual choices, since agents become more likely to buy a
treatment in the private hospital. This has to be weighted by the number f(y˜) of agents at the
threshold income and by the cost of public funds, λ.
The first term in the numerator of (17) is the equity term and is positive since cov (Φ′u′,k) < 0
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(i.e. choosing the private hospital is negatively correlated with the marginal utility of consumption as
this corresponds to higher income levels). It calls for a tax on the private hospital treatment as this
enables to increase the tax paid by high-income agents and thus to foster redistribution.
The second term in the numerator of (17) is the effect of y˜c on the congestion, F (y˜)/xˆ− 1, and on
the resource constraint. It is negative since the term in brackets is positive and ∂y˜c/∂τ < 0. Indeed,
when τ increases, more agents choose the private hospital. The benefits are twofold. First, an increase
in the subsidy decreases congestion in the public hospital, which increases the utility of all agents
using it. Second, it relaxes the resource constraint by reducing the total cost from running the public
hospital. Summing up, this second term in the numerator is related to efficiency and pushes toward
subsidization of the price of the treatment in the private hospital so as to decrease the number of
agents using the public hospital.
Depending on the relative importance of redistribution and efficiency concerns, τ∗ could be either
positive or negative. If the efficiency effect dominates the redistribution effect, it is optimal to subsidize
the treatment in the private hospital. As an example, let us consider the case where u (c) is linear and
the social planner is utilitarian (Φ(.) is linear) so that there is no redistributive concern (cov (Φ′u′,k) =
0). The subsidy on p simply corrects for the fact that agents do not perfectly internalize congestion
and the true cost of the public hospital. On the contrary, if redistributive concerns are very large, a
tax on the price of the treatment in the private hospital (τ∗ < 0) is optimal.
To sum up, we showed that, when the social planner cannot assign agents, income redistribution
is limited by the fact that the quality of the congested hospital depends on the number of patients
treated by this hospital, which increases in T and decreases in τ .22 Our result differs from Hoel and
Sæther (2003): in their framework, the absence of redistribution motives always calls for a positive
subsidy on the treatment in the private hospital. In our model, we could as well have a subsidy or a
tax.
5 Conclusion
This paper studies the optimal income taxation scheme in the presence of both a public congested
hospital and a private non congested one. In our model, agents have different incomes and have to
22Similarly, Marchand and Schroyen (2005) show that linear taxation is limited by its impact on waiting times. In
their model, labor is endogenous so that an increase in the income tax decreases the opportunity cost of waiting. While
they consider linear taxation of income, we consider a subsidy on the non congested private hospital.
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choose whether to be treated in the public or the private hospital. The public hospital is free of charge
but exhibits congestion whose size depends on the number of patients. Differently from the previous
literature, we do not focus on the optimal size of the public health system, but rather on the relation
between endogenous congestion and income redistribution under asymmetric information.
We first find that, under pure in-kind redistribution, the number of agents being treated in the
public hospital is too high compared to the first-best: agents do not internalize the effect of their
choice on congestion. Under symmetric information, even if agents can freely choose the hospital, it
is possible to implement the first best through progressive taxation and a subsidy on the use of the
private hospital.
We then turn to the asymmetric information problem. First, we analyze the second-best allocation
when the social planner can assign agents across hospitals. Agents are proposed a menu including a
probability of being assigned to the public hospital and an income tax. We find that the probability
of being treated in the public hospital decreases in income and that congestion is higher than in the
first best. Such a taxation scheme prevents mimicking by high-income agents, and allows for higher
marginal tax rates than otherwise possible. Thus, a system where the rich can opt out or are left out
from the public health system could have some appeal in terms of income redistribution. However, we
also show that the presence of congestion makes redistribution more distortive; as such, it limits the
extent of redistribution with respect to the case where the quality of the public sector is directly set
by the social planner.
Second, we study a problem where agents are free to choose which hospital to patronize. In this
case, the only instruments available are a lump-sum tax and a subsidy on the price of the private
hospital. We find that the optimal subsidy is either positive or negative depending on the relative
importance of redistribution and efficiency concerns. Interestingly, if the public sector can be congested,
its redistributive role is undermined. If congestion is not too much of a problem, high-income agents
face a tax on the use of the private health sector so as to redistribute resources toward low income-
agents. Yet, it is lower than if the quality of the public sector had been directly controlled by the
planner. If congestion is a strong concern, it may thus even be optimal to have a subsidy, in order to
encourage people to patronize the private system and to reduce congestion.
In concluding, it is important to mention that public or private ownership does not really matter
in our model: if the congested hospital was privately owned, our results would still be valid as long as
the government acts as a third-party payer.
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Our model relies on some important assumptions. The first one is that the public capacity is
fixed. As we already mentioned, we believe that it is a reasonable assumption in the short run.
Moreover, our research question does not concern the optimal size of the public system, but rather
the optimal redistribution schemes when a public system already exists. This is certainly relevant for
many countries in which the presence of a universal health system can be considered as given, due to
political constraints.
Another assumption concerns the modeling of individual utility functions. We use a utility function
that is separable in the utility of consumption and in the benefit from the treatment (i.e. on congestion).
Allowing for non separability would have been at the expense of increased complexity.
Finally, in this paper, we assume that all agents suffer from the same illness and that the treatment
can be obtained both in the public and in the private system. This may not always be the case. Some
public hospitals may specialize in treating illnesses that require specific and expensive technologies
which are not profitable for private hospitals. It would be interesting to see how our results would
be modified when taking into account differences in hospital specialization together with different
treatments needs (which may eventually be correlated with incomes). This is in our research agenda.
23
References
[1] Besley T. and Coate S., 1991, Public provision of private goods and the redistribution of income,
The American Economic Review, 18(4), 979-984.
[2] Besley T., Hall J. and Preston J., 1999, The demand for private health Insurance: do waiting lists
matter?, Journal of Public Economics, 72(2), 155-181.
[3] Blackorky C. and Donaldson D., 1988, Cash versus kind, self-selection, and efficient transfers, The
American Economic Review, 78(4), 691-700.
[4] Blomquist S. and Christiansen V., 1995, Public provision of private goods as a redistributive
device in an optimum income tax model, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 97(4), 547-567.
[5] Boadway R. and Marchand M., 1995, The use of public expenditure for redistributive policy,
Oxford Economic Papers, 47, 45-59.
[6] Brito D.L., Hamilton J.H., Slutzky S.M. and Stiglitz J.E., 1995, Randomization in optimal income
tax schedules, Journal of Public Economics, 56, 189-223.
[7] Bucovetski S., 1984, On the use of distributional waits, Canadian Journal of Economics, 17(4),
699-717.
[8] Clark J. and Kim B. , 2007, Paying vs. waiting in the pursuit of specific egalitarianism, Oxford
Economic Papers, 59, 486-512.
[9] Cremer H. and Gahvari F., 1997, In-kind transfers, self-selection and optimal tax policy, European
Economic Review, 41, 97–114.
[10] Cremer H., F. Gahvari and Ladoux N., 1998, Externalities and optimal taxation, Journal of Public
Economics, 70, 343-364.
[11] Fleurbaey, M., 2008. Fairness, responsibility and welfare. Oxford University Press.
[12] Hoel M. and Sæther E.M., 2003, Public health care with waiting time: the role of supplementary
private health care, Journal of Health Economics, 22, 599-616.
[13] Iversen T., 1997, The effect of a private sector on the waiting times in a national health service,
Journal of Health Economics, 16, 381-396.
24
[14] Jofre-Bonet M., 2000, Public health and private insurance demand: the waiting time as a link,
Health Care Management Science, 3, 51-71.
[15] Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research Education Trust, 2011, A primer on medicare
financing, available at <http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7731-03.pdf>.
[16] Kopczuk W., 2003, A note on optimal taxation in the presence of externalities, Economics Letters,
80, 81-86.
[17] Laffont J-J. and Tirole J., 1993, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press.
[18] Marchand M. and Schroyen F., 2005, Can a mixed health care system be desirable on equity
grounds?, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 107(1), 1-23.
[19] OECD, 2004, Private Health Insurance in OECD Countries - Policy Brief, available at
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/6/33820355.pdf>
[20] Pirttila J. and Tuomala M., 1997, Income tax, commodity tax and environmental policy, Interna-
tional Tax and Public Finance, 4, 379-393.
[21] Russo A., 2013, Pricing of transport networks, redistribution and optimal taxation, forthcoming
Journal of Public Economic Theory.
[22] Sandmo A., 1975, Optimal taxation in the presence of externalities, The Swedish Journal of
Economics, 77(1), 86-98.
[23] Sheshinski E., 2004, On atmosphere externality and corrective taxes, Journal of Public Economics,
88, 727-734.
[24] Siciliani L. and Hurst J., 2005, Tackling excessive waiting times for elective surgery: a comparative
analysis of policies in 12 OECD countries, Health Policy, 72, 201-215.
25
APPENDIX
A Proof of Proposition 2
Let us first define the disposable income, i.e. the income y net of taxes, as
Dy ≡ y − Ty
In the following, we show how to choose the appropriate levels of
(
Ty, T
′
y, τ
)
in order to implement the
first-best allocation
(
c¯, θFB
)
. To do so, an agent with income y will be attributed Dy with probability
θFB , and D
′
y with probability (1 − θFB). To be optimal, this allocation
(
Dy, D
′
y, τ
)
should satisfy
three conditions. The first two conditions relate to the choice of optimal consumption levels while the
last one relates to the optimal partition between hospitals.
1. Consumptions should be equal to the first best level, namely Dy = c¯ and D
′
y − (1− τ)p = c¯.
2. This allocation
(
Dy, D
′
y, τ
)
should also satisfy the government budget constraint, evaluated at
the optimum,
E [y]− θFB(Dy + k)− (1− θFB)(D′y + τp) ≥ 0.
3. Under this allocation
(
Dy, D
′
y, τ
)
, agents with income y should choose the public hospital, that
is
[u(Dy)− u(Dy − (1− τ)p)] ≥
[
θFB
xˆ
− 1
]
,
and agents with income y′ should choose the private hospital, that is
[
u(D
′
y)− u(D
′
y − (1− τ)p)
]
≤
[
θFB
xˆ
− 1
]
.
Setting, as in condition 1,
Dy = c¯
D
′
y = c¯+ (1− τ)p
26
trivially satisfies condition 2. This implies differentiated lump-sum taxes / transfers equal to
Ty = y − c¯ ≶ 0
T
′
y = y
′ − (c¯+ (1− τ)p) ≶ 0
for agents visiting the public and the private hospital, respectively.
Replacing for the expressions of Dy, D
′
y and θFB in the inequalities of condition 3, we obtain
A ≡ u(c¯)− u (c¯− (1− τ)p) ≥
[
θFB
xˆ
− 1
]
(19)
and
B ≡ u (c¯+ (1− τ)p)− u(c¯) ≤
[
θFB
xˆ
− 1
]
. (20)
Let us first mention that the above inequalities imply that necessarily τ ≤ 1 so that there can be at
best a complete reimbursement of the price of the treatment at the private hospital. Since u is concave,
A ≥ B. Furthermore, both A and B increase when τ decreases. Thus, (19) is satisfied for any τ ≤ τ¯ ,
where τ¯ is implicitly defined by
u(c¯)− u (c¯− (1− τ¯)p) =
[
θFB
xˆ
− 1
]
.
In a similar way, (20) is satisfied by any τ ≥ τ , where τ is implicitly defined by
u (c¯+ (1− τ)p)− u(c¯) =
[
θFB
xˆ
− 1
]
.
By concavity of u(.), τ¯ > τ . Consequently, there exists a set of subsidies [τ ,τ¯ ] satisfying inequalities
(19) and (20).
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B Asymmetric information and possibility to assign agents to the
public system
Replacing (11) into (12) and rearranging terms yield:
µyu
′′(y − Ty) + u′(y − Ty)µ˙y = λf (y)− Φ′ (EUy)u′(y − Ty)f (y)
⇐⇒ ∂µyu
′(y − Ty)
∂y
= λf (y)− Φ′ (EUy)u′(y − Ty)f (y)
Using the transversality conditions, µy = µy¯ = 0, we obtain
µy =
´ y¯
y
(Φ′ (EUx)u′(y − Tx)− λ) f(x)dx
u′(y − Ty)
The sign of µy depends on the sign of the numerator. Since Φ′ (EUy)u′(y − Ty) is decreasing, the
numerator is first decreasing and then increasing. This, combined with the transversality conditions,
implies that the numerator is always negative and µy < 0. Overall, given the transversality conditions,
one has that µy ≤ 0 for every y ∈ [y, y¯].
Using αy/f(y) = λ/u′(y − Ty) − µyu′′(y − Ty)/(u′(y − Ty)f(y)) and the expression for µy, we
compute the derivative of αy/f(y) with respect to θy:
∂αy/f(y)
∂θy
= − u
′′(y − Ty)
f(y)u′(y − Ty)
∂µy
∂θy
=
u′′(y − Ty)
f(y)u′(y − Ty)
×
wΦ′′ (EUy)u′(y − Ty)f(y) +
´ y¯
y
∂w
∂θy
θx
(
Φ
′′
(EUx)u
′(y − Tx)
)
f(x)dx
u′(y − Ty)

which is always positive. Thus the second-order condition with respect to θy holds so that, using the
implicit function theorem, we get:
sign
(
dθy
dy
)
= −sign
(
∂αy/f(y)
∂y
)
.
Consequently, θy is decreasing in y only if αy/f(y) is increasing in y.
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C Proof of Proposition 4
Using the first-order conditions (15) and (16), we obtain
∂£c
∂τ
=
∂£
∂τ
+
∂£
∂T
∂T
∂τ
(21)
where £c denotes the compensated Lagrangian and where ∂T/∂τ = [1− F (y˜(T, τ))] p is obtained from
the resource constraint of the government. In the following we use the compensated derivative of y˜
with respect to τ , ∂y˜c/∂τ , defined by (18). Replacing for (15), (16), and (18), (21) can be rewritten as
∂£c
∂τ
= −∂y˜
∂τ
[
∂w
∂y˜
ˆ y˜
y
Φ′ (u(y − T ) + h− w(y˜)) f(y)dy − λ(k − τp)f(y˜)
]
+p
ˆ y¯
y˜
Φ′ (u(y − T − (1− τ)p) + h)u′(y − T − (1− τ)p)f(y)dy − λ [1− F (y˜)] p
+
∂T
∂τ

− ´ y˜y Φ′ (u(y − T ) + h− w(y˜))u′(y − T )f(y)dy
− ´ y¯
y˜
Φ′ (u(y − T − (1− τ)p) + h)u′(y − T − (1− τ)p)f(y)dy
− ∂y˜∂T
[
∂w
∂y˜
´ y˜
y Φ
′ (u(y − T ) + h− w(y˜)) f(y)dy − λ(k − τp)f(y˜)
]
+ λ

= −∂y˜
c
∂τ
[
∂w
∂y˜
ˆ y˜
y
Φ′ (u(y − T ) + h− w(y˜)) f(y)dy + λ(k − τp)f(y˜)
]
+p

´ y¯
y˜
Φ′ (u(y − T − (1− τ)p) + h)u′(y − T − (1− τ)p)f(y)dy
− [1− F (y˜)] ´ y˜y Φ′ (u(y − T ) + h− w(y˜))u′(y − T )f(y)dy
− [1− F (y˜)] ´ y¯
y˜
Φ′ (u(y − T − (1− τ)p) + h)u′(y − T − (1− τ)p)f(y)dy

The last term in brackets is the covariance between the marginal utility of consumption and the choice
of the private hospital and is defined by
cov (Φ′u′,k) =
ˆ y¯
y˜
1× Φ′(UPR)u′(y − T − (1− τ)p)f(y)dy +
ˆ y˜
y
0× Φ′(UPU )u′(y − T )f(y)dy
− [0× F (y˜) + 1× (1− F (y˜))]
×
(ˆ y˜
y
Φ′(UPU )u′(y − T )f(y)dy +
ˆ y¯
y˜
Φ′(UPR)u′(y − T − (1− τ)p)f(y)dy
)
where UPR = u(y− T − (1− τ)p) + h and UPU = u(y− T )−w(y˜) + h. The indicator k = {0, 1} takes
value 0 (resp. 1) if the agent chooses the public (resp. private) hospital. At the optimum, rearranging
∂£c/∂τ = 0 yields Proposition 4.
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